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WHAT CONSTITUTES THE VALID DELIVERY OF A DEED.
I
General Divisions o'f the 5Subject.
I
When foiind in the hands of the Grantee.
When found in the hands of a Stranger to be
delivered upon the performance of a Condition.
ili
Whnen found in the hands of a Stranger to be
delivered without Condition.
IV
When found in the hands of the Grantor.
"A deed" says Littleton, "is a writing or instru-
ment sealed and delivered to prove the agreement of the
parties to what is contained therein." Without discuss-
ing the merits of this definition from the standpoint of
modern statutory law it will be assumred at the outset
that the grantor in the deed has done all that is necess-
ary for him to do, to make the indtrument a valid deed
with the exception of delivering it. This delivery is
therefore the last of a series of acts which together
make up the completed instrument ; and from which it de-
rives its force and validity. Rut delivery is not from
the fact of its being the last of the series, to be re-
garded as of less importance than any of its predecess-
crs; for its presence, like the last lin in a chain span
ning the gulf, is vital, and the law, far from indulging
any presumption on the ground of what Ias already been
done, declares in unqualified terms that a deed without
2delivery is void and can convey nothing.
The delivery of a deed, like the disposition of
property by will, is treated by the law with r,-reat len-
iency ; for each is bound only by such rules as are ab-
solutely necessary to prevent fraud and imp)osition ; and
in each formality has given place to intent as the cri-
terion by which courts are to be -uided. This movement
has made it necessary for the courts to take under judie
cial interpretation a great variety of acts and circum-
stances from which the intent of the .yrantor may be de-
rived ; and hence the oft repeated saying in the books
that a deed may be delivered by some act without words,
or by words without any a(.t of delivery, or by words and
acts together. It would be impossible to make anything
more than a general classification of the circumstances
under which a deed may be delivered ; and such a classi-
f&cation Ihzas been attempted as above set forth.
The first dividion of the subject, namely, when the
deed is found in the hands of the grantor, will now be
discuss ed.
3A deed found in the hands of the grantee, named there-
in, is prima facie evidence cf a delivery ; (97 N. Y. 13,
27 Penn. St. 30. ) and, while clear and convincing evi-
dence to the contrary is required to rebut this presump-
tion , (88 Ill. 378. )4 the fact that it is only a pre-
sumption indicates that there may have been a mere tra-
dition of the deed to the grantee, for purposes other than
delivery ; and such, indeed, may be the case ; then the
tradition may have been made to await the determination
of the grantee as to whether or not he will accept the
deed. (4 ,Yeyes 315. )
This situation is illustrated in the case of Ford
v. James when a deed was placed in the hands of the
grantee to await his acceptance ; and in the course of the
opinion the court said,- "he did not deliver it to James
as and for the deed of the grantor, but merely left it
with him as a depository, until he should determine w
whether or not he would take the land : this constitutes
no legal delivery."
"A deed may be deposited with the grantee or handed
4to him for any purpose other than as the deed of the
grantor or as an effective instrument between the parties,
without becoming at all operative as a deed." (24 Wend.
279. 1 Conn. 494. )
A deed may also be placed in the hands of the grantee
for the purpose of examination ; to be returned if found
defective ; or it may be there in the process of trans-
mission to a third party to hold as an escrow; or again
it may be held by the -rantee to await the action of some
third party. (20 N. Y. 77, 13 N. J. Eq. 454. 23 Wend
43. 8 Mass. 230. 108 111. 336. 13 0. St. 253. 28 N. Y.
333. )
This situation does not at all conflict with the
well known principle that a deed can not be delivered to
the grantee, therein named, as an escrow, for, if done, it
will take effect instanter and the condition will be void.
(4 Watts, 180. 23 J. & S. 98. 21 Mass. 518.)
In the one case there has been no delivery and no
intent to deliver ; but a mere tradition, which like the
offer in any contract, is subject to revocation before
acceptance, or before what amounts to acceptance ; the
grantee has not received the deed as grantee; but as a
mere agent of the grantor, and subject to his direction.
Uin the case of delivery as an escrow, the grantor
has bound himself, from the moment of placing the deed
within the hands of the depositary,. to observe the condi-
tion upon which it was so depo-sited ; and to permit the
deed to take effect upon the performance of the same.
(5-80 Wis. 644. 31 Amer. Dec. 563. b N. Y. 629. il
Wash. 318. ) This is believed to be the distinction as
supported by the weight of authority ; though the courts
are not in entire harmony upon this point. C Contra
4 Day 66. 57 Mich. 264. ) A deed absolute upon its
face and in the hands of the grantee my also be shown
to be a mortgage, and the following quotation from the
Supreme Court. of Pennsylvania may be of value on this
point :-- "It is true the written defeasance bears
date a few days after the date of the conveyance. if
they bear even date they constitute in law a mortgage;
but when the defeasance is of a later date it is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to determine under the parol
evidence whether the conveyance was a mortgage." (1
Penn. St. 71. )
"While a subsequent independlent agreement to recow.-
y, on repayment of the purchase money, will no~t change
an absolute conveyance int a mortgage, yet the fact that
6the defeasance bears a later date does not preclude a par-
ty from showing by parol that it was executed in pursu-
ance of an agreement under which the deed was made and
delivered ; thus forming a part of the same.transaction."
Although it is competent to show that a deed found
in the hands of the grantee was obtained surreptitious-
ly, a court of law can give no aid to a grantor who has
once made a valid delivery of his deed, though it be
done under false representations of the grantee or through
some mistake of fact or law. ( 21 N. Y. 279. 58 N. Y.
627. Tkdeman's Real Property, Sec. 812.
Under these circumstances, in order to divest the
title, it will be necessary to appeal to equity ; but, if
in the meantime the rights(0f ,an innocint purchaser have
intervened, the latter's titl.e will be indefeasible.
Whether, therefore, in any given case a valid delive-
ry has been made is a question of intent ; and this by
the great weight of authority is held to be the crucial
test ; but since the intent can be but an inference drawn
from th~e facts in each case, these res gestae may be such
as to permit of but one conclusion ; and under such cir-
cumstances the co~urt would be warranted in taking the case
from the jury and directing a verdict. ( 121 Ill. 91.
7118 Mass. 154. 79 N. Y. 525. 30 Me. 110. 13 0. St.
253. 28 N. Y. 333.
As to w1hat acts of the parties will lead to an inev-
itable conclusion of an intent to deliver, the court in
Souuerbyb v. Arden said : "But if there be no such agree
ment or intention made known at the time and both parties
are presentl and the usual formalities of execution take
place and the contract is to all appearance consummated
and the deed is left in the power of the grentee or in
the custody of his particular friend, without special in-
struction, there is no case to be found in law or equity
in which such a deed is not head binding." (1 John ch.
255.)
At the present day, however, even in the face of such
formality, it has been held that parol evidence may be in-
troduced to show a prior agreement, on the part of the
parties ; not that the deed shall not take effect, but
that until something be done it shall not be considered
as having been delivered ; and in this connection it may
be well to quote the very pertinent and suCWinct language
of an early New York case as follows : "Whe t~her a deed
has been delivered or not is a question of fact upon
which from the very nature oif the case parol evidence is
8adxnissible." (108 I1. 360. Ill Wash. 293. 11 Bar-
ber 351. )
"But whether a deed when delivered shall take effect
absolutely or only upon the performance of some condition,
not expressed therein, cannot be determined by parol ev-
idenc e."
The delivery of a deed differs frcrn an offer in a pa
rol contract in that the one is irrevocable before accept-
ance and the other may be revoked ; but they are similar
in the fact that both require acceptance : in the one
case before title can pass to the grantee% and in the
other before the contract can be binding upon the offeree
or the offeror. (Anson on Contracts 31. )
A deed in the hands of the grantee, however, is pri-
roa facie evidence of acceptance ; but this presuxnption
may be rebutted by parol evidence to the contrary, and
until there has been an acceptance, express or implied,
the title remains in the grantor, subject to the claim
of his creditors. After there has once been a valid der-L
livery of a deed, the title cannot be made to revert by a
redelivery of the deed; for a title can be transferred
only by deed. (42. N. J. L. 279. 39 N. H.505. 3 N. H.
99. 95 I11. 27. . 47. Barb. 505. 45 N. H. 505. 4 Wend.
9474. 1 Ohio 321. 2 Wend. 617. )
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When found in the hands of a Stranger to be
delivered upon the performance of a Condition.
Chancellor Kent, in the Comentaries says that the
delivery of a deed in escrow is "a conditional delivery
to a stranger to be kept by him until certain conditions
be performed and then to be delivered over to the grantee."
Whether a deed when placed in the hands of a third
party is to take effect as an escrow or is to pass title
at ounce, must in all ceses depend upon the intent with
which the deed was deposited ; but when this intent
is a matter of inference, then the weight of authority
holds that if the delivery depends upon a condition it
is an escrow ; and if upon the happening of an event.it
is, in the phrase of the courts, the "grantor's deed
presently." Passing over, for the present, the criti-
cism made by later cases upon this attempt to distinguish
between a condition and an event ; and to base decisions
upon such distinctions, an effort will be made to show
that even by the earlier cases these distinctions, if
l1
there4 were any at all, were ,erely nominal" and that, in
fact,, deeds delivered to third persons to be deliverted
to the grantees named on the performance of a condition
or the occurrence of an event, were treated in every res-
pect as escrows. (34 N. Y. 360. 30 Wis. 651. 111 Wash
301. 5 Met. 414. 8 Met. 439. 54 Pa. 26. 72 Pa. 441.
15 Wend. 660. 5 Conn. 320 111 Wash. 300. )
In the case of Foster v. Mansfield which is often
cited as an authority for the above doctrine, Shaw C. J.
said "Wh1j.en the future delivery is to depend upon the
payment of money or th9 performance of some other condi-
tion it will be deemed an escrow." (3 Met. 414. 54 Penn
26. 72 Penn. 441. ) "When it is merely to wait the
lapse of time or happening of some contingency and not
the performance of any condition it will be deemed the
grant or's deed presently; still it willnot take effect
as a deed until the second4delivery; but when thus de-
livered_ it will take effect by relation from the first
del ivery,."
"But this distinction is n,'t now very material be-
cause when the deed is delivered as an escrow and after-
wards and before the second delivery the grantor be-
comes incapable of making a deed, the deed should be
ll
considered as taking effectifrom the first delivery; in
order to accomplish the intent of the grantor which
would otherwise be defeated by the intervening in capaci-
This opinion as far as its authority goes shows be-
yond question that the phrase, "grantor's deed present-
ly" in such general use, does not mean that an absolute
title passes to the grantee, when the deed is delivered
to the depositary; for if this were so the succeeding
sentencle: "Still it will not take effect as a deed until
the second delivery but when thus delivered it will
take effect by relation from the first delivery",
would be absolutely devoid of sense. What possible ne-
cessity could there be for the legal fiction of relation
if the title has already passed ?
Again, in the case of Stewart v. Stewart in which
the grantor deposited with a third party a deed conveying
property to h^+; children, to be delivered upon his death,
the court held,- "it never was the intention of Stewart
to devise his estate but to convey it by deed." ( 6 Conn
"The instrument of conveyence ha' two witnesses only
and is therefore deficient in legal formalities indis-
12
pensable to a devise : besides it is strictly spealing a
deed taking effect from its execution. I do not mean
that it was consummate nor is it necessary it should be,
but that it was efficacioes to the passing of th'.e inter-
est conveyed from the delivery of the deed to the trustee
or agent-."
Again, in the case of Tooley v. Dibble, in which the
facts were essentially those of the preceding casel,
with the addition that a quit-claim deed was given-by the
son between the first and second delivery of the deed in
question :- it was held that the deed of the son passed
title as against the heirs of the father ; but would not
have done so against the intervening rits of third
persons; and this would have been the exact situation had
the deed been pressly deposited as an escrow; to pass
title upon the death of the grantor; and, indeed, the
opinion of thle court contains the words : "If not tech-
nically an escrow it was in the nature of one and on the
death of defendant's father it took effect by relation,
etc." ( 2 Hill, (i41.)
There can certainly be no better illustration of an
event, pure and simple, than the death of the grantor;
but in the absence of an express intent to the contrary
the courts have almost uniformly treated this as an es-
crow ; that is, have applied to it the doctrine of rela-
tion. (72 Penn. 434. 77 311. 47-- 34 O. St. 610.
37 Mich. 264. 34 N. Y. 9 . 5 Conn. 316.
I think, therefore, we may agNlt with Chief Justice
Shaw, in holding that there is no material distinction
between a deed to be delivered upon a condition or event;
both are subject before the condition or event to the
intervening rights of third parties ; neither are subject
tb the intervening claim of the grantor or his privies;
the one may take effect by relation if necessary to avoid
the intervening incapacity of the grantor, by reason of
death or otherwise; the other will always take effect, by
relation, but the result as regards the granteel title
will be precisely the same. (13 N. J. Eq. 459. 4 Kent,
454. 30 Wis. 644. )
There seerns to be, at least, two criticisms made by
same authorities upon the practice of courts in holding
that a deed to be delivered by the depositary upon the
death of the grantor should be treated as an escrow.
It is obviously necessary that in order to pass
title, b_ the deed, the courts must resort to the leg'al
fiction of relation; but, the critics argue, this doc-
14
trine of relation is only a fiction, which as between the
parties is intended to avoid something which ray, not
something which will necessarily happen to make the sec-
ond delivery impossible. (Taft v. Taft XXX1]J A.L.J.
26G. ) 'X It would seem that in Wheelwright v. Wheel-
wright the court in showing w the doctrine of relation
should apply to a deed to be thus delivered, prove by
the examples given, not that relation may take place when
the death of the grantor is the event upon which the sec-
ond delivery is to be made; but that if his death inter-
vene between the first delivery and the event upon which
the second delivery is to be made,that thus there may be
a relation. (2 Mass. 254. )
The second criticism is to the effect that such doc-
trine encroaches upon the domain of the testamentary
disposition of property; and in Hathaway v. Payne,
Denio C. J. said :- "If it were an original question, 1
should suppose that such a transaction was of a testa-
mentary ch aracter and that it would be inoperative for
want of the attestation required by th~e Statute of Wills.
(34 N. Y. 113. 30 Wis. 644. 2, Ves. Jr. 231. ) "But
the cases establish the rule as 1 have stated and they
should not now be disturbed."
15
In the case of Pintzman v. Baker, the theory is ad-
vanced that when the event upon which the delivery is
to take place is one which is certain to]o happen, that the
title passes at once"; qualified only by the right of the
grantor to use and occupy or take and receive the rents
and profits during his life or until the event shall
have happened upon which the second delivery is to be
made." (4o Wis. 644.)
In support of this doctrine the court refers to
Hathaway v. Payne and Tooley v. Dibble ; but in the one
case the deed was held to be good by relation and in the
second case as shown above the quit-claim deed was held
to convey title only as against the claim of the grant-
or and his heirs. (34 N. Y. 115. 2 Hill 641. )
This position is further criticised by Campbell C. J.?
in Taft v. Taft when he says - "A deed of conveyance
in present terms, is inconsistent with the retention of
a life estate and from the time when the deed is deliver-
ed as a conveyance the whole title goes with it and it
be comes irrevocable. " (5; Mich. 34 N. Y. 92.)
There are many propositions regarding an escrow in
which the courts are in substantial harmony and thtese
will not be briefly noticed. In accord with the prin-
16
ciple that the delivery of a deed may be proved by parol,
it is competent to prove by parol the condition on which
an escrow is to be delivered, though it would be other-
wise were the condition unwritten and part of a con-
tract.required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing.
(42 Wis. 437. ) As indicated above, a deed when delivered
as an escrow is irrevocable nor can the grantor gain con-
trol of it except as the condition permits ; and especi-
al stress is laid upon thaSprinciple when the event upon
which delivery is to be made is the grantor's death.
(Cases cited above. 30 Wis. 651. 34 N. N. 360. 4 N.Y.
92. 42 O. St. 47. 66 Me. 316..)
A deed in order to be deposited as an escrow must
not be in the possession actual or constructive of either
the grantor or grantee; and thus the necessity of the
depositary being a stranger ; though he may be regarded
as the agent of both parties in the sense that he is as
much bound to deliver the deed on performance of the con-
dition, as he is to with hold it until perfoxnance.
(4 Yris. 4535. 7 Ohio, 2 3.)
]t is, however, rather the performance of the con-
dition than the second delivery wh ich passes the title,
for though as a rule, the title is said not to pass un-
17
til the second delivery, still, if for any reason the
grantor becomes incapacitated to deliver a deed before
the condition is performed, the deed will be considered
valid as of the time of the first delivery, when the
condition is afterwards performed. ( 14 Ohio, 308. 30
Wis. 644. 1 John. ch. 279. ) It should be observed,
however, that where the deed is not to be delivered until
something has been done after tlhe death of the grantor,
it is void and can pass no title as against the heirs of
the grantor. (Taft v. Taft 59 Mich. )
If an escrow be-delivered before the performance of
the condition it cannot affect the title in the grantor;
even if afterward it be recorded and then transferred to
an innocent purchaser ; for no deed can be delivered wit1k
out the consent of the grantor ; though upon t;he second
point the authorities are not in entire harmony.
(22 Me. 569. 10 Penn. 285. 4th Edition I11 Wash. 303.
I]]
When found in the hands of a stranger to be
delivered without condition.
That a deed, thus delivered, may pass a present
title, its delivery to the depositary must be with the
intent so to do ; and though no formal words are necessa-
ry, still, the mere fact of handing the deed to the de-
positary will raise no presumption of an intention to
deliver, as it will when delivered in person to the grant-
ee or'to his agent. (15 Wend. 6b6. 3 Ohio St. 377. )
In this case it becomes as necessary for the grantor to
part with all right and title to the deed as if it were
delivered to the grantee ; for the depositary now be-
comes a mere bailee of the deed for the grantee and sub-
ject to his direction. (30 Wis. 644. 34 N. H. 476.
14 Ohio, 310.)
With regard to the acceptance of a deed in the hands
of a third party, whether it is to be delivered to the
grantee with or without any condition, the general prin-
ciple may again be stated that no offer under seal can
be revoked by the grantor or his privies at any time be-
19
fore acceptance ; though in the case of an escroW the
failure of the condition may, per se, permit such re-
vocation.
The ri uht&of third parties, however, are governed
by a different rule ; for until there has been an accept-
ance the property is subject to such riF.tX (47 Barb.
505. 45 N. .IT 505. ) An acceptance may be actual, as
when the gifantee actually assents, or it may be presumed
either from the acts of the grantee with knowledge of
the deed or from the nature of the deed itself as being
beneficial to grantee, or from tlhe situation or condition
of the grantee as in the case of infancy or insanity.
The rule as above laid down cannot be changed by
the fact that the acceptance did not take place until
after the death of the grantor. (9 Mass. 307. 54 Penn.
St. 26. ) When there has been no express assent and the
deed is beneficial to the grantee, and, whether the
latter knew of it or not, the law will then raise a pre-
sumption of assent, which however, is not, per se, suf-
ficient to pass the title ; but is merely prima facie
evidence of assent and may be rebutted by showing a dis-
sent. ( 4th Edition ILl Wash . 291. 3 Ohio. St. 377.
31 Conn. 428. 28 iowa 240. ) Where property is thus
20
deeded to a grantor, under disabilities, this presump-
tion then becomes a rule of law and the property vests
at once, so as to bar the claims of third parties.
(30 St. 587. 47 N. H. 479. 39 111. 413. 6 28 iowa 241).
The relation of the depositary to the grantee may be
such as to make the assent of t he former sufficient to
vest the title in the grantee ; as for example, an ac-
ceptance of a deed by a father or mother for his or her
infant child. )47 N. H. 479. i John. ch. 456. )
There is also a class of cases in which from the be-
neficial nature of the grant, the law raises a conclusive
presumption of acceptance ; namely, those conveyances
which insolvent debtors make for the benefit of credit-
ors ; by delivering absolutely and unconditionally a
deed of assi.7nient to a third person to be delivered to
the creditor. Such a deed, though not accepted, will
take precedence of an attachment intervening between the
delivery to the depositary and the actual acceptance.
(lb Peters 19. 18 Conn. 257. )
21
IV
When found in the hands of the Grantor.
It is trite law that when there has once been a
valid delivery of a deed, no act of the grantor can des-
troy the title in the grantee ; but, since delivery is
always a matter of intent, the facts and circumstances
of each case must be weighed, to determine not only that
the intent once existed but that it existed at the time
the acts relied upon were done.
On this subject Chancellor Kent says : "if both
parties be present and the usual formalities of execution
take place and the contract is to all appearances con-
sunnTated without any condition or qualification annex-
ed, it is a complete and valid deed, notwithstanding it
be left in the custody of the grantor;" and, indeed, it
is well established that the grantor after delivery may
keep the deed as the mere bailee of the grantee.
(IV Kent Com. 455. 41 N. Y. 416. 116 Penn St. 6. )
Cases often arise wh~ere no formal delivery can be
proved and even where nothing was said by the parties
present in regard to delivery ; but, notwithstanding, an
intent that the property should pass may be gathered from
other circumstances ; as, for instance, where a deed of
Lands is prepared for execution, signed by both parties,
sealed and acknowledged, it has been held delivered
though% the witnesses present declared there had been no
formal delivery, and the deed was found among the papers
of ti-te grantor after the latter's death. (15 W/end. 545.
126 Mass. 454. ) No deed, however, which did not vest
a title in the grantee during the life of the grantor,
and which was found in tIe passession of the grantor at
his death, can be of any avail as a conveyance. (41 N.Y.
416. 32 A.L.J. 251. ) At the time when delivery is made
neither the grantee nor his agent need be present ; for,
although., as a rule, delivery and acceptance must be con-
temporaneous acts, still, in the case of voluntary con-
veyances the acceptance when made will relate back to
the time of delivery and take effect as of that time- to
the exclusion of all claims except those of third par-
ties ; and in case the grantee be under any disability,
then the presumption of acceptance will be made a rule of
law and will bar the claims even of third parties.
Therefore, where there has once been a valid delivery
of the deed, an acceptance of the same even after the
23
death of the grantor will operate to cut off the rights
of those claiming under the grantor. The great strugglez
in the courts, however, arise over the interpretation of
acts of the grantor in delivering ; and not so much
over those of the grantee in accepting ; for as has often
been said the deed derives its force and validity from
its delivery rather than frohn its acceptance.
There is a decided tendency in the courts to favor
the operation of a deed of voluntary settlement, and to
give greater force to the acts of both grantor in deliv-
ering and of the grantee in accepting the same in
the case of 9ouverbye v. Arden, Chancellor Rent says
"A voluntary settlement fairly made is always binding in
equity upon the grantor, unless there be clear and de-
cisive proof that he never parted or intended to part
with the possession of the deed ; and, even if he retain
it, the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of its
validity unless there be other circumstances besides the
mere fact of his retaining it, to show that it was not
intended to be absolute." Cl Jo'm.. Ch. 240. 12 Jo1u.
ch. 536. ) This, however, in the light of later decis-
ions is an extreme view and the courts of New York now
refuse to be guided by the doctrine ; "because" as was
24
said in a late case of' that state "it wholly dispensed
with any evidence of delivery" and, indeed, the view of
the New York courts seems to be supported by the weight
of authority. (41 N. Y. 416. 7 N. Y. 22.)
in gritchfield v. Critchfield fror, its being ne-
cessary to prove that a deed, beneficial on its face to
the grantee and found in the possession of the grantor,
was not intended by the grantor to pass title the courts
say : "Thie presmption arising from the acknowledgement
before the magistrate that the deed had been duly signed
/
sealed, and delivered was rebutted by the fact that the
grantor took the deed away from the office and kept it
in his own possession."
In Patterson v. Snell, the court say : "The possess-
ion and production of a deed by the grantee is prima
facie evidence of its having been delivered and for like
reasons, in the absence of all contradictory testimony
the presumption arises, when found in t1n possession
and produced by the grantor, that it has not been de-
livered." (67 Maine. )
in the case of Cannon v. Cannon A, with his wife
executed voluntary deeds to B and C withtout their knowl-
edge. (26 N. J. Eq. ) He gave the deeds to his wife
25
telling her to be careful of them but without other in-
structions or authority to deliver them ; and, during his
absence from home, and without his knowled:e or consent,
his wife induced B and C tC: convey the property to her,
and it was held that the deed to B and C never passed
title.
Again, in the case of Powers v. Russell these words
occur in the opinion : "When a registered deed puroortig
to have been delivered has been lost, the presumption is
that it was delivered to the grantee ; but this presump-
tion, which would arise from the loss is rebutted if
the original deed is produced and is then in tihe custody
of the grantor."
The illinois courts, however, hold a doctrine more
in accord with gouverbye v. Arden above. (32 A.L.J.
251. ) These cases, therefore, seem to indicate that
the mere possession of the deed thc;uh it be a voluntary
one by the grantor will not support any presumption of
acceptance; because in such a case there can be no pre-
sumption of delivery but rather th e contrary. There arg
however', certain acts of the grantor which, standing
alone, the courts will regard as prima facie evider~e of
delivery; and prominent ariong thJese is the recording of
26
a dee-; for by such an act the grantor necessarily in-
tends to give notice to the world that the title to
certain property has been taken from hirn and put in his
grantee ; and in the absence of controlling evidence to
the contrary the courts will regard the grantor as havin)
delivered the deed. (23 Wend. 43. 107 111. 87. 3 Ohio
St. 377. See 117 N. Ye, 258. ) But the recording must
be done during the life and with the consent of the
grantor and the presumption of a delivery arising from
the record is repelled when it appears that the grantee
never was in possession and that the grantor and his
heirs have remained in undisturbed possession for more
than forty years without recog;nizing any rights under
the deed. (67 Me. 559. 71 N. Y. 474. ) The fact
that the deed is a pure and unqualified gift or is a
conveyance to grantees under any disabilities will
gr.eatly strengthen the presumption of a delivery arising
from the record of t.e deed. With reg, ard to the necessi-
ty of an assent by the grantee where the conveyance is
of thze above character, ] desire to quote s crewhat at
length from the very forcible opinion of Judge' Thurmnn
in the case of Mitchell v. Ryan. (6 Ohio St. 37r%. )
in the course of his opinion the Judg e said : "I is
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true that judges have said with more solen-iity than 1
think the occasions warranted, that no one can have an
estate thmst upon him against his will; and that conse-
quently a delivery of a deed to a stranger for the use
of the grantee is of no effect until assented to by the
latter."
"How much weight this argument is entitled to may
be judged by the fact that estates are every day thrust
upon people by last will and testament and it would cer-
tainly sound somewhat novel to say that the devises were
of no effect until assented to by the devisees."
"If a father should die devising an estate to his
daughter and the latter should afterwards die without a
knowledge of' thwe will it would hardly be contended that
the devise became void for want of acceptance; and that
the heirs of the devisee must lose the estate."
"Add to these the estates that are thrust upon
people by the statiute of descent and we begin to esti-
mate the value of the arguament that a man shall not be
made a property holder against h is will; and that courts
should be astute to shield him from such a wrong."
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"When the -;rant is a pure unqualified -:-ift I think
the true rule is th,_at the presumption or acceptance can
be rebutted only by proof of dissent; and it matters not
that the grantee never knew ol the conveyance for as his
assent is presumed from its beneficial character, the
prestumption can be overthrown only by proCf that he did
know and rejected it."
"f th.is is not so how can a deed be made to an
infant of such tender years as to be incapable of assent'?
"Is it the law that if a father makes a deed of gift
to an infant child and delivers it to the recorder for
the use of the child and to vest the estate in it, the
deed is of no effect until the child grow to years of
intelligence and give its consent ?" "May the estate
in t-.e meantime be taken for the subsequently contracted
debts of the father or will the statute or limitations be-
gin to run in favor of the trespasser upon the idea
that the title remains in the adult?" "1 do not so
tuderstand the law. in such a case thte acceptance of
thre grantee is a presumption of law arising from the
bene2icial nature of the grant and not a rmere presumption
of an actual acceptance. "
"And for the same reason that the law makes the
29
presumption it does not allow it to be disproved by
anything short of actual dissent.
Lastly it may be said that the mere signing and ac-
knowled,-ing of an instrument, will not, unless accompa -
nied by other acts, be sufficient to constitute a deli-
very. (24 Penn. St. 100. 5 Hump. 349. Cannon v. Cannon
26 N. J Eq.J
It would be impossible even to outline the variety
of circumstances in which evidence may be given to sup-
port and rebut presumptions of the grantor's intent, and
it is but mere repitition to say that whern a deed is re-
tained by the grantor the real test is, can the grantee
get possession of it ? Can he enforce it against the
grantor's will ? Did the grantor intend that at all
events and in-ediately it should operate ?

